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Neural processes mediating contextual inﬂuences
on human choice behaviour
Francesco Rigoli1, Karl J. Friston1 & Raymond J. Dolan1,2
Contextual inﬂuences on choice are ubiquitous in ecological settings. Current evidence
suggests that subjective values are normalized with respect to the distribution of potentially
available rewards. However, how this context-sensitivity is realised in the brain remains
unknown. To address this, here we examine functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
data during performance of a gambling task where blocks comprise values drawn from one of
two different, but partially overlapping, reward distributions or contexts. At the beginning of
each block (when information about context is provided), hippocampus is activated and this
response is enhanced when contextual inﬂuence on choice increases. In addition, response
to value in ventral tegmental area/substantia nigra (VTA/SN) shows context-sensitivity,
an effect enhanced with an increased contextual inﬂuence on choice. Finally, greater response
in hippocampus at block start is associated with enhanced context sensitivity in VTA/SN.
These ﬁndings suggest that context-sensitive choice is driven by a brain circuit involving
hippocampus and dopaminergic midbrain.
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T
he inﬂuence of context on value-based choice is substantial
and ubiquitous. A classic example is the framing effect, in
which risky options are preferred when choices are
framed in terms of losses rather than gains1. Recent evidence
suggests that an inﬂuence of context on choice behaviour arises
because subjective values are normalized with respect to the
distribution of potentially available rewards2–7. As an everyday
example, this entails that the very same dish will be evaluated
as better in a bad restaurant than would be the case if evaluated
in a good restaurant.
Recently, there have been attempts to identify neural
mechanisms underlying choice adaptation to context-sensitive
reward distributions. One candidate mechanism is suggested
by the observation that, in several brain structures, activity
elicited by reward adapts to context such that an outcome
produces a larger response when the associated reward distribu-
tion has lower values2,6,8–11. This effect is seen in brain regions
involved in processing expected value (EV) and reward prediction
error (RPE), including ventral striatum12,13, ventral tegmental
area/substantia nigra (VTA/SN)6,14, orbitofrontal cortex12,15–18,
amygdala19 and parietal cortex20. We recently reported a direct
association between context-sensitive reward adaptation in the
brain, speciﬁcally in VTA/SN, and choice adaptation6. However,
fundamental questions about the neural substrates of behavioural
adaptation to context remain unanswered.
One unanswered question relates to which aspects of neural
adaption mediate choice adaptation. Several models are
proposed2,6,8–11,16,21,22, and two key predictions arise out of
these. First, neuronal representations of a reference point
(for example, reﬂected in basal neural ﬁring rates) might
change so that a context characterized by small rewards would
be linked to a lower reference point, leading to enhanced
responses to reward with an associated impact on choice
behaviour11,23,24. Second, choice adaptation might be mediated
by a gain modulation, leading to an enhanced signal-to-noise
ratio in response to reward and thereby eliciting a context effect
on choice8,10,21,22,25,26. Both these (additive and multiplicative)
proposals entail a normalization that renders subjective value a
function of reward that is scaled relative to alternative outcomes.
Another important question regards the precise brain circuits
that represent context for reward information. A candidate
region is the hippocampus as there is substantial evidence that
this region processes contextual information in several cognitive
domains27–30. For instance, the hippocampus is implicated in
contextual fear processing31–34, in remembering the spatial
context in which an object has been encountered35,36 and
in conditional discrimination tasks where contextual information
is critical37. In addition, recent studies show the hippocampus is
involved in complex aspects of reward processing38–47.
Here, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we
investigated the neural underpinnings of choice adaptation to
context-speciﬁc reward distributions. Participants were presented
with a monetary reward, varying trial-by-trial, and were asked to
choose between half the amount for sure and a gamble associated
with an equal probability of obtaining either the full amount or
zero (Fig. 1a). In this way, the two options had equivalent EV.
Trials were arranged in short blocks (ﬁve trials each), each
associated with one of two subtly different gambling contexts
involving speciﬁc, but partially overlapping, distributions
of EV. In a high-value context, possible EVs were d3, d5 and
d7, and in a low-value context they were d1, d3 and d5. At the
beginning of each block, a panel delivered information about
the context, by showing the average trial amount; that is,
d6 corresponding to d3 EV, and d10 corresponding to d5 EV
for the low- and high-value context, respectively. We
predicted this information would elicit activity in regions
representing context-sensitive reward distributions, in particular
the hippocampus, and that the magnitude of responses would
correlate with the degree of contextual adaptation inferred from
choice behaviour.
We also exploited the presence of choices common to both
contexts (that is, associated with d3 and d5 choices in both
contexts) to probe the link between VTA/SN and choice
adaptation, by comparing neural responses to identical choices
in a low- and high-value context. An increased activation to these
choices in a low-value context (and a correlation of this increase
with the degree of choice adaptation) would suggest that a
modulation in reference point underlies choice adaptation
(that is, an additive normalization). Conversely, an increased
‘difference’ in VTA/SN activation between d5 and d3 choices in
the low- compared with high-value context (and a correlation of
this effect with the degree of choice adaptation) would suggest
that an enhanced signal-to-noise ratio in value signalling
(as implied by adaptation of neural gain) underlies choice
adaptation (that is, a multiplicative normalization). Formally
speaking, in terms of experimental design, the reference point
(subtractive normalization) hypothesis predicts a mean effect of
context, while the modulation (divisive normalization) hypothesis
predicts an interaction between choice (d5 versus d3) and
context (low versus high). Importantly, both of these (orthogonal)
effects would constitute evidence for contextual normalization
of subjective value above and beyond evidence for standard EV
theory, implicit in the main effect of choice (d5 versus d3).
Consistent with our predictions, we observed that, at the
beginning of each block (when information about context
is provided), hippocampus is activated and this response is
enhanced when contextual inﬂuence on choice increases.
When examining choices common to both contexts, we found
that response to value in VTA/SN shows context-sensitivity
consistent with adaptive gain control, an effect enhanced with an
increased contextual inﬂuence on choice. Finally, we show
that greater response in hippocampus at block start is associated
with enhanced context sensitivity in VTA/SN. These ﬁndings
suggest that context-sensitive choice is driven by a brain circuit
involving hippocampus and VTA/SN.
Results
Behaviour. Across participants (n¼ 30), average gambling
exceeded 50% (mean¼ 63; s.d.¼ 14; t(29)¼ 24.62, Po0.001;
two-tailed Po0.05 was used as the signiﬁcance criterion for
behavioural tests). Such overall risk seeking behaviour is consistent
with evidence from studies where, similar to our task, small
monetary payoffs were used48. Given the ﬁxed relationship
between the gamble and the certain gain, the only independent
measure varying trial-by-trial was the EV, which was equal for
both options (sure and gamble options) on each trial. We assessed
the impact of this variable in a logistic regression model of
gambling probability, ﬁnding that participants gambled more with
lower EVs (t-test on the slope parameter of the logistic regression:
t(29)¼  2.30, P¼ 0.03). There was no correlation between the
individual effect of EV (that is, the slope parameter of the logistic
regression model) and the average gambling percentage (Fig. 1b;
r(30)¼ 0.06, P¼ 0.74). The latter result replicates previous
ﬁndings6,7 and supports the idea of a differentiation between an
average gambling propensity and a preference to gamble with large
or small EV as determinant of risk choice.
Using a similar paradigm6,7, we showed a context effect
consistent with the idea that the subjective value of a reward is
smaller in the high- compared with low-value context. However,
in previous studies, the context changed rarely (about every
10min) rendering it unclear whether an effect of context emerges
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only after extensive learning. In the present experiment, we were
able to resolve this ambiguity by exploiting a task design where
we used short blocks that allowed contexts to alternate quickly
(every 30 s).
Consistent with value normalization to context, across
participants, we observed a positive correlation between the
differential gambling percentage for EVs common to both
contexts (that is, the gambling percentage in low-value minus
high-value context for d3 and d5), and the effect of EV on
gambling percentage (that is, the slope parameter estimated in a
logistic regression; Fig. 1c; r(30)¼ 0.50, P¼ 0.005). Similar to
our previous studies6,7, this ﬁnding shows the direction of a
contextual inﬂuence depends on a subject-speciﬁc propensity to
gamble more with large or small rewards (Fig. 1d). In other
words, participants who risked more with increasing EVs
gambled more when equivalent choices were larger compared
with the context, whereas participants who risked more with
decreasing EVs gambled more when equivalent choices were
smaller compared with the context. This is consistent with the
notion that the subjective value of a reward is smaller in the
high- compared with low-value context, and indicates that such
contextual effects emerge even without extensive training.
To better characterize the mechanisms underlying choice
behaviour and to quantify the level of inﬂuence exerted by
context on value normalization, we ﬁt a mean-variance return
model that computed subjective values consistent with individual
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Figure 1 | Behavioural results. (a) Experimental paradigm: on every trial, participants were presented with a monetary gain amount (d10 in the example) in
the centre of the screen. They had to choose between receiving half of it (d5 in the example) for sure or select a 50:50 gamble associated with either the
full amount or a zero outcome (hence options had always equivalent EV). After an option was selected (by pressing one of two buttons on a keyboard—left
for the gambling, right for the safe option), the outcome appeared for 1 s. During a 1.5 s inter-trial interval, a monetary amount was visible on the top of the
screen (in brackets) that indicated the average amount of monetary amount associated with the current block. A low-value context was associated with d2,
d6 and d10 amount (corresponding to d1, d3 and d5 EV, respectively), and a high-value context to d6, d10 and d14 amount (corresponding to d3, d5 and d7
EV, respectively). Contexts alternated pseudo-randomly every 5 trials. (b) Relationship between individual average gambling proportion (x-axis) and the
beta weight (labelled as gambling slope; y-axis) of the logistic regression of choice behaviour with EV as predictor (r(30)¼0.06, P¼0.74, non signiﬁcant).
(c) Relationship between the gambling slope (x-axis) and the difference in gambling proportion for d3 and d5 choices (common to both contexts)
comparing the low-value context (LC) and the high-value context (HC) (y-axis; r(30)¼0.5, P¼0.005). (d) Gambling proportion plotted separately for
participants with negative (n¼ 16; on the left) and positive (n¼ 14; on the right) gambling slope parameter, for different EVs and contexts. Error bars
represent standard errors. Considering choices common to both contexts (that is, d3 and d5), it is evident that participants who risked more with
decreasing EVs (that is, with a negative gambling slope) gambled more when equivalent choices were smaller compared with the context; whereas
participants who risked more with increasing EVs (that is, with a positive gambling slope) gambled more when equivalent choices were larger compared
with the context.
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choices. If the reward associated with the safe option was A,
then the value of the safe option was:
VCERT ¼ A wt: ð1Þ
Where, w encodes the low- (w¼ 0) or high-value context
(w¼ 1), and the context parameter t implements (subtractive)
normalization of the reward amount associated with the
high-value context. This formulation implies that the mean and
variance of the gamble are A wt and (A wt)2, respectively,
making the value of the gamble be:
VGAMB ¼ A wtþ a A wtð Þ2þ m; ð2Þ
where a is a value-function parameter which determines whether
(a40) or not (ao0) reward variance is attractive, and m
represents a gambling bias parameter. According to this model,
the probability of choosing the gamble is given by a softmax
choice rule:
s VGAMBVCERTð Þ ¼ 1= 1þ exp VGAMBþVCERTð Þð Þ: ð3Þ
We used the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC; summed
across participants) to compare this model with simpler models,
where one or two parameters were set to zero: model comparison
favoured the full model (model with a, m and t, BIC¼ 19,070;
model with a and m, BIC¼ 19,427; model with a, BIC¼ 22,866;
model with m, BIC¼ 22,237).
The value-function parameter a captures a propensity to
gamble as a function of reward variance, which in our design
corresponds to choice EV. Therefore, we expect this parameter to
be correlated with (although not equivalent to) the effect of choice
EV on gambling percentage (that is, the effect of EV on gambling
percentage as indexed by the slope of a logistic regression), a
prediction conﬁrmed by data (r(30)¼ 0.91, Po0.001). This
ensures that the value-function parameter a has construct validity
in relation to (logistic regression) indices of risk preference. An
explicit generative model (instead of a logistic regression model)
elucidates the computations underlying choice, can be applied to
all choices under risk (and not, like the logistic regression model,
only when EV is equivalent across options as in our task), and
allows estimating the context parameter t, which is the key
variable in our formulation.
To assess whether our model can explain the main behavioural
ﬁndings, we used the model and subject-speciﬁc parameters
estimates to generate simulated data and perform the behavioural
analyses on the simulated data. Consistent with real data, the
full model replicated the lack of correlation between average
gambling and the effect of EV on gambling (that is, the slope
of the logistic regression) (r(30)¼ 0.083, P¼ 0.66), while a
correlation emerged when data were simulated using a model
without the gambling bias parameter m (r(30)¼ 0.95, Po0.001).
Again consistent with empirical data, the full model replicated
the correlation between the effect of EV on gambling and
the difference across contexts in gambling for choices common
to both contexts (r(30)¼ 0.54, P¼ 0.002); a result not
obtained using a model without the value-function parameter a
(r(30)¼ 0.14, P¼ 0.45) or without the context parameter t
(r(30)¼  0.02, P¼ 0.90).
To examine robustness of model parameters, we estimated new
parameters from data simulated with the parameters inferred
from real data. Parameters estimated from real data were
highly correlated with parameters estimated from simulated data
(a, r(30)¼ 0.95, Po0.001; m, r(30)¼ 0.92, Po0.001; t, r(30)¼
0.89, Po0.001). Moreover, the average gambling proportion in
simulated data was highly correlated with the average gambling
proportion in real data (r(30)¼ 0.92, Po0.001), and the effect of
EV on gambling percentage (that is, the slope parameter of the
logistic regression model) in real data was highly correlated with
the same effect in simulated data (r(30)¼ 0.88, Po0.001).
Collectively, these analyses validate the generative model and
show that it can account for the main empirical results.
The generative model allowed us to estimate the degree of
context sensitivity as captured by the context parameter t, so that
the relationship between this parameter and neural responses
could be investigated. The effect on choice of varying the context
parameter is illustrated in Supplementary Fig. 1. As expected, we
found that the context parameter t was positive across participants
(t(29)¼ 2.7, P¼ 0.01), indicating that subjective values were
normalized so that rewards were afforded less/more subjective
values in the high/low context. The context parameter t was
uncorrelated with other measures (average gambling:
r(30)¼  0.060, P¼ 0.750; value-function parameter a, r(30)¼
0.150, P¼ 0.430; gambling bias parameter m, r(30)¼ 0.120,
P¼ 0.528), ensuring that its relationship with neural responses
(reported below) is not confounded by other behavioural factors.
Normalization in the model is subtractive. We compared such
model with a model where normalization was divisive, where the
value of the sure option is VCERT¼A/(1þ wt) and the value of
the gamble is VGAMB¼A/(1þ wt)þ a (A/(1þ wt))2þm. The
divisive normalization version of the model ﬁts less well
than the subtractive normalization version (BIC¼ 19,079
and BIC¼ 19,070, respectively). The context parameters in the
two models were highly correlated (r(30)¼ 0.87, Po0.001). To
ascertain that the neural results presented below in relation to the
parameter t were not due to the particular normalization used in
the behavioural analysis, we re-ran all the neural analyses using
the context parameter extracted from the divisive normalization
model, and obtained similar results.
Imaging. Our principal goal was to identify the neural correlates
of contextual choice adaptation. To do that, we estimated a
general linear model (GLM) including a stick function regressor
at option presentation separately for each speciﬁc EV (d1, d3 and
d5 for the low-value context and d3, d5 and d7 for the high-value
context) in addition to a stick function regressor at the ﬁrst trial
of blocks. Our ensuing statistical parametric mapping (SPM),
analyses focused on regions of interest (ROIs), namely VTA/SN,
ventral striatum and hippocampus. For the latter structure, our
focus was on the posterior portion, which has been shown to be
particularly linked with context processing27,28,31,32. ROIs’
signiﬁcance statistics were small-volume corrected (SVC) with
Po0.05 family wise error (see the ‘Methods’ section for details).
We ﬁrst tested for brain regions responding to contextual
reward information. We reasoned that these regions should be
activated following the ﬁrst trial of each block, when information
about context was provided. Hence, we contrasted the regressor
associated with the ﬁrst trial against baseline and found a
signiﬁcant response in right posterior hippocampus (Fig. 2a; 32,
 37,  12; Z¼ 4.02, P¼ 0.003 SVC; Montreal Neurological
Institute coordinates were used) but not VTA/SN or ventral
striatum (P40.05 SVC). If this signal was linked with processing
contextual reward information, one would predict an association
between this signal and the impact of context on choice. We
tested this both across and within participants. Consistent with
our prediction, across individuals we found a positive correlation
between the context parameter t (reporting the inﬂuence exerted
by context on choice behaviour) and the response induced by
contextual cues (at the start of each block) in the right posterior
hippocampus (Fig. 2b; 32,  34,  8; Z¼ 3.19, P¼ 0.038 SVC).
When examining variability within single participants, we
predicted an increased effect during task sessions characterized by
enhanced contextual inﬂuence on choice. We tested this by
ﬁtting, for each participant, the computational model of
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behaviour separately for the ﬁrst and second task session. The two
estimates of the context parameter t were correlated across
subjects (r(30)¼ 0.38, P¼ 0.01) and there was no systematic
difference between the ﬁrst and second session (t(29)¼ 1.28,
P¼ 0.21). We considered the difference between the context
parameter in the ﬁrst and second session and investigated
the relationship between this difference and neural response to
contextual cues. A signiﬁcant positive correlation was evident in
right posterior hippocampus (Fig. 2c; 32,  29,  7; Z¼ 3.28,
P¼ 0.030 SVC). This analysis shows a within-subjects
relationship between responses in hippocampus and the
context effect on choice behaviour. Speciﬁcally, task sessions
associated with increased hippocampal activity for contextual
cues were also associated with enhanced contextual adaptation in
choice behaviour.
We next investigated context-sensitive (value-related) neural
responses and their link with choice adaptation by focusing on
the time of option presentation. At this time, activity in VTA/SN
and ventral striatum has been shown to correlate with the average
EV of options (or with the value of the chosen option)49.
However, important questions on the role of context remain
unanswered. First, it is unclear whether the signal at option
presentation adapts to reward distribution expected in a given
context. One hypothesis is that adaptation is slow because it
depends on an average reward representation, which only
changes with extensive experience23. Alternatively, the response
might adapt immediately to the context, as observed with the
presentation of single cues and outcomes13,14. Experiments
that have manipulated reward context have generally used
long blocks (that is, in the order of several minutes)6, leaving
this issue open. Second, it is unclear whether adaptation can be
explained by a change in neural reference point (subtractive
normalization) or gain (divisive normalization)8,10,21,22,25,26.
Third, it is yet to be established whether these putative forms
of context-sensitive normalization are related to choice
adaptation to context.
To address these questions, we tested two key hypotheses by
analysing the response to d3 and d5, choices that were common
to both contexts (Fig. 3). A reference point shift predicts
increased activation for (common) choices in the low- minus
high-value context (a main effect of context). A contextualizing
divisive normalization predicts an increased difference in
responses to d5 and d3 choices across contexts (an interaction
effect; note that a main effect of high- versus low-value choice
would identify regions encoding value per se).
We ﬁrst identiﬁed areas responding to increasing EV levels,
comparing responses at option presentation to the largest EV
choice (that is, d7 in the high-value context) with the lowest EV
choice (that is, d1 in the low-value context). Increased activity
was observed in bilateral ventral striatum (Fig. 4a; left:  10, 8,
 2; Z¼ 5.11, Po0.001 SVC; right: 12, 13, 0; Z¼ 5.21, Po0.001
SVC) and VTA/SN (Fig. 4b;  8,  17,  15; Z¼ 3.80, P¼ 0.005
SVC). To ensure that the further analyses (reported below)
focused on voxels sensitive to EV, activations were masked by a
contrast comparing d7 and d1 EV choices, using a Po0.005
uncorrected threshold. For completeness, we also analysed the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, another region involved in
processing reward information50. Several reports (including our
previous study6) indicate that, at option presentation, activity in
this region reﬂects the subjective value of the chosen minus the
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unchosen option and not the average EV of option50. As
predicted, no voxel in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (deﬁned as
a 10mm sphere ROI centred on prior coordinates49: 2, 46,  8)
showed an effect for this contrast (even using Po0.05
uncorrected) and consequently this region was not considered
further.
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When testing for a main effect of context (subtractive
normalization), an increase in the low-value context was seen
in bilateral ventral striatum, although only as a trend on the right
side (left:  3, 10,  10; Z¼ 3.07, P¼ 0.046 SVC; right: 4, 10,
 7; Z¼ 2.87, P¼ 0.073 SVC). Data from VTA/SN were less
clear, with a main effect of context in VTA/SN showing only as a
weak trend ( 5,  19,  12; Z¼ 2.49, P¼ 0.095 SVC; P¼ 0.006
uncorrected). However, an interaction was evident in VTA/SN,
indicating that the difference in activity between choices
associated with d5 minus choices associated with d3 was
larger in the low- compared with the high-value context
(Fig. 5a;  3,  24,  22; Z¼ 3.23, P¼ 0.036 SVC). No
interaction was detected in ventral striatum (P40.05 SVC).
We also assessed at a between and within-participants level to
investigate whether the context-sensitive effects were related
to choice adaptation. We found no evidence in any ROI
for a relationship between the context parameter t (reporting
the inﬂuence exerted by context on choice behaviour) and a
contrast comparing d5 and d3 choices in the low- minus
high-value context. Conversely, across individuals we found a
positive correlation between the context parameter t and the
interaction effect in VTA/SN (Fig. 5b;  1,  22,  20; Z¼ 3.22,
P¼ 0.037 SVC). In other words, the change in the differential
activation for d5 minus d3 choices across contexts was more
pronounced in participants exhibiting a greater contextual
inﬂuence on choice. As above, we also considered the
difference between the context parameter t in the ﬁrst and
second session and investigated the relationship between this
difference and the neural interaction effect for the ﬁrst minus
second session. A signiﬁcant correlation was seen in VTA/SN
(Fig. 5c; 2,  22,  15; Z¼ 3.39, P¼ 0.018 SVC).
Overall, these data establish a rapid context-sensitive
normalization of subjective value in ventral striatum, consistent
with a reference point shift (but not with adaptive gain control),
independent of choice adaptation. The data also show a rapid
contextual adaptation in VTA/SN consistent with adaptive gain
control, with weaker evidence for a reference point shift in this
region. Moreover, the adaptive gain control effect in VTA/SN was
correlated with choice adaptation.
An intriguing possibility is that the hippocampal encoding of
contextual cues mediates a context-sensitive adaptation in
VTA/SN, and subsequent choice adaptation. This implicates a
modulatory effect, such that adaptation in VTA/SN is enhanced
when the hippocampal response to initial trials of blocks
(associated with contextual cues) is greater. To test this we
performed a psychophysiological interaction analysis (PPI)51 at
the subject level. In PPI analyses, the interaction between a
psychological factor and a physiological response is used to
predict observed activity elsewhere in the brain. Here, we
extracted the individual contrast coefﬁcients reﬂecting the
hippocampal response during initial trials (at the peak-
activation voxel). This physiological response was then used to
predict the adaptation (that is, interaction comparing low- versus
high-value context for d5 minus d3 choices) in VTA/SN. We
found a signiﬁcant PPI in the VTA/SN (7,  14,  12; Z¼ 3.68,
P¼ 0.005 SVC). This result is consistent with an hypothesis that
(initial responses in) the hippocampus mediates context-sensitive
adaptation in the VTA/SN. In other words, participants with
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Figure 5 | The impact of context on activity in VTA/SN. (a) Brain activation at option presentation in VTA/SN for choices associated with d5 EV minus
choices associated with d3 EV when comparing low- and high-value context ( 3,  24,  22; Z¼ 3.23, P¼0.036 SVC). Signiﬁcance threshold of
Po0.005 is used in the ﬁgure for display purposes. The faint blue line represents our ROI relative to VTA/SN. (b) Relationship between the individual
context parameter t (reporting, for each participant, the degree of contextual adaptation during the task) and the neural contrast related to choices
associated with d5 minus choices associated with d3 when comparing low- and high-value context in VTA/SN ( 1,  22,  20; Z¼ 3.22, P¼0.037
SVC). Data are plotted for the peak-activation voxel (plot is for display purposes only and no further analyses were performed on these data). (c)
Relationship between (i) the difference in the individual context parameter t when comparing the ﬁrst and second session of the task and (ii) the contrast
related to choices associated with d5 minus choices associated with d3 when comparing low- and high-value context in VTA/SN (2,  22,  15; Z¼ 3.39,
P¼0.018 SVC). Data are plotted for the peak-activation voxel (plot is for display purposes only and no further analyses were performed on these data).
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increased hippocampal response to contextual cues also exhibited
enhanced VTA/SN adaptation. In a subsidiary (within-subjects)
analysis, we extracted the individual contrast coefﬁcients
reﬂecting the hippocampal response during initial trials for ﬁrst
versus second task session. This physiological response was
then used to predict the difference in adaptation across sessions
(that is, the difference across sessions for the interaction
comparing low- versus high-value context for d5 minus d3
choices) in VTA/SN. The interaction effect in VTA/SN was
again signiﬁcant ( 4,  21,  15; Z¼ 3.41, P¼ 0.008 SVC).
This result suggests that sessions with increased hippocampal
response to contextual cues were also characterized by enhanced
VTA/SN adaptation.
Overall these ﬁndings suggest an enhanced neural adaptation
in VTA/SN when the hippocampus responds more to
contextual cues. This supports an hypothesis that hippocampus
is involved in mediating context-sensitive evaluation by
controlling response adaptation in VTA/SN, with a subsequent
effect on choice adaptation.
Discussion
Recent evidence suggests contextual effects on choice behaviour are
explained by subjective values adapting to the context in which
rewards are evaluated, whereby they are increased with a reduction
in potentially available rewards2–7. Although this effect is relevant
in many real-life conditions, its neural underpinnings are largely
unknown. Our ﬁndings illuminate this context-sensitive evaluation
by showing that the hippocampus plays a key role in representing
information about reward context, and that its response to
contextual information is tightly coupled with the degree of
adaptation in choice behaviour.
Across many domains, it is well-established that posterior
hippocampus is a key structure in processing contextual cues. For
instance, this region is strongly implicated in processing contextual
fear31–34, in remembering the spatial context in which an object
has been encountered35,36, and in conditional discrimination
tasks where contextual information is crucial37. We build on
this evidence, extending the scope of hippocampus to include
processing information about reward context as well as
highlighting a tight coupling between these contextual inﬂuences
and choice behaviour. Although fMRI data do not allow causal
interpretations, the correlation between neural and behavioural
effects (both within and between participants) suggests an
hypothesis that responses in this region might endow choice
behaviour with context sensitivity.
Recent models of choice behaviour view subjective values as
inherently context-dependent, and this is supported by numerous
empirical ﬁndings2–7,11,21,22. This notion is also implicit in
models where planning is conceived as (active) inference52–54,
where subjective values become preferences or ‘prior beliefs’
(about outcomes) that are necessarily normalized, so that they
sum to one in any particular context. These models propose that
the subjective value of an outcome depends on its relative
preference compared with other potential outcomes. In turn, the
distribution of potential outcomes is determined by the statistics
of the environment, which depend strongly on context. This idea
can explain several empirical phenomena including contextual
adaptation, the concave shape of the utility function and
inter-temporal choice preferences5.
Our ﬁndings are consistent with the idea that hippocampus is
crucial for representing a reward context, which in turn inﬂuences
a computation of subjective values. It has been proposed that
subjective values depend on comparing the value of a target
outcome against the value of potential outcomes sampled from
memory5. Within this framework, hippocampal recruitment might
facilitate a sampling of potential outcomes associated with a given
context43. An alternative possibility is that neural activity in this
region represents the sufﬁcient statistics of the context per se. These
statistics might be used to estimate subjective values, a process
which might engage Bayesian approximate inference in the form of
free-energy minimization53–55.
One of the most important ﬁnding in rat studies shows that
hippocampal neurons are activated when animals occupy
speciﬁc spatial positions56,57. The same neuron can be activated
for a location in one spatial context and for another location
in another context. However, these neurons tend to respond
in corresponding locations in different contexts58. For instance, a
neuron associated with the centre of an experimental chamber is
likely to respond to the centre of a second experimental chamber.
It has been hypothesized that this form of neuronal coding
might also be deployed in non-spatial tasks59. We can speculate
that this may also extend to contextual reward processing.
One way this could be realised is by different hippocampal cells
being preferentially activated by speciﬁc instances within a reward
context. In addition, similar to reports in the spatial domain58,
this representation might be normalized so that neurons respond
to relative values of rewards within the distribution, and hence to
different EVs in different contexts, provided their relative
subjective value is equivalent. Note, this form of value coding is
different from that observed in regions classically linked to value
representation, such as ventral striatum and VTA/SN6,13,14,60–63.
In these regions, neuronal activity correlates with EV (and RPE).
Our ﬁndings raise a possibility that hippocampal neurons might
encode contextual information that is necessary for, or dependent
on, a context-sensitive encoding of subjective value.
Recent studies have highlighted a role for hippocampus in
(spatial and non-spatial) planning tasks, where value computation
is involved, suggesting this structure might be fundamental in
representing state-outcome contingencies that are the building
blocks of goal-directed or prospective (as opposed to habitual and
retrospective) choice38–47. This implies that computations more
directly related to EV are performed somewhere else in the brain,
in structures like basal ganglia, VTA/SN and prefrontal cortex. Our
ﬁndings raise the possibility that, at least in some cases—for
instance, when the context changes rapidly—the hippocampus
might play a more direct role in reward processing, and speciﬁcally
in the contextualization of value.
We note that several studies have shown responses consistent
with adaptive coding in ventral striatum12,13, VTA/SN6–14,
orbitofrontal cortex12,15–18, amygdala19 and parietal cortex20. For
example, in a recent experiment12, participants chose between
variable delayed payment options across two conditions, where the
delay spanned either a narrow or wide range. Activation in ventral
striatum was consistent with predictions of range adaptation12.
Here, we extend these ﬁndings by showing a link between neural
adaptation and choice adaptation, suggesting that the former might
mediate the latter6.
Consistent with previous reports6, our data indicate that an
inﬂuence of context on choice behaviour is mediated via VTA/SN
neural adaptation at choice presentation. Moreover, in line with
previous ﬁndings6, we saw no link between choice and neural
adaptation in ventral striatum, supporting further an hypothesis
of a distinct role for this structure and VTA/SN in contextual
adaptation. Note that a link between VTA/SN and choice
adaptation is particularly strong, given that both participants
with enhanced choice adaptation exhibited greater interactions
between choice and context (that is, neural adaptation) and task
sessions with enhanced choice adaptation were characterized by
increased neural adaptation. Our data demonstrate that a neural
adaptation at option presentation can emerge also when a context
changes quickly rendering it unlikely that this process is driven by
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a slow accumulation of experience with reward over time23. One
possibility is that a reward distribution is learnt in association
with a context and that this representation is activated when a
particular context is presented, and is reﬂected in activation in
VTA/SN and in choice behaviour. More generally, our
data support a proposal that normalization processes in the
brain might represent a canonical form of neural computation
encompassing different cognitive functions, from vision to
value-guided choice25,26.
In our previous study6, the use of long blocks did not allow us to
assess whether VTA/SN adaptation can be explained by a shift in
reference point and/or by adaptive gain control. The former
hypothesis suggests that, for choices associated with the same
EV, responses would increase in a low-value context compared
with a high-value context, since the low-value context would be
characterized by a smaller reference point. However, our data only
marginally support a reference point normalization in VTA/SN
(as the corresponding effect emerged only as a weak trend), and
they show no relationship between a reference point adaptation
and choice adaptation. Conversely, VTA/SN adaptation
demonstrated an increased difference between choices associated
with d5 and d3 when comparing neural responses in the low- and
high-value context, an effect related to choice adaptation.
Several theoretical perspectives suggest that context should
induce divisive normalization in both value-related brain regions
and choice behaviour2,8,10,21,22,25,26. These models are only
partially supported by our data, which show that divisive
normalization in VTA/SN is linked with an adaptation in
choice, but highlight a subtractive—and not divisive—
normalization in choice behaviour. This suggests that divisive
normalization in VTA/SN may mediate subtractive normalization
in choice. However, further theoretical and empirical research is
needed to fully understand the link between divisive
normalization in VTA/SN and subtractive normalization in
choice, and to clarify whether, and how, other aspects of VTA/SN
adaptation are involved.
VTA/SN is the main dopaminergic hub in the brain, and
substantial evidence supports a central role of dopamine in
motivation and adaptive behaviour23,64,65. The functions of
dopamine are the subject of ongoing debates and one recent
proposal has suggested it might be crucial in representing the
precision of policies, a concept closely related to neural gain, in the
context of incentive value53. The observed gain adaptation in
VTA/SN linked to choice behaviour seen in our data supports this
view, consistent with the idea that this region regulates the
incentive value of rewards based on the contextual information, via
neural gain control.
An intriguing hypothesis is that the hippocampal response to
contextual cues is involved in setting a context by inﬂuencing a
response adaptation in VTA/SN, and in turn mediating an impact
on subsequent choice behaviour. At least three questions arise
from this hypothesis. Is there a relationship among contextual
effects in hippocampus, VTA/SN and choice behaviour? Do
contextual effects in hippocampus precede effects in VTA/SN?
Do experimental manipulations of hippocampal response have an
impact on contextual effects in VTA/SN response and choice?
Our design allowed us to investigate the ﬁrst two questions. In
relation to the ﬁrst question, we provide evidence of a relationship
between contextual inﬂuences on hippocampal neural responses
and choice, in VTA/SN and choice, and between contextual
effects in hippocampus and VTA/SN. In relation to the second
question, we found that the context effect in the hippocampus
precedes adaptation in VTA/SN, since the former occurs when
contextual cues are presented and the latter manifests at option
presentation. However, the third question remains open and is
likely to require the use of techniques where hippocampal
activation can be manipulated directly (for example, through
optogenetic interventions).
In conclusion, we provide evidence which suggests that the
hippocampus and VTA/SN represent information about the
prevailing reward context, and that their responses are associated
with the degree of inﬂuence of context on choice behaviour. Our
results highlight the importance of context in choice and propose a
link with its neural substrate. Understanding the cognitive and
neural mechanisms of contextual inﬂuences is crucial for clarifying
the deep nature of choice and to explain important ecological
phenomena (for example, in economics) and in psychopathologies
(for example, pathological gambling and drug abuse).
Methods
Participants. Thirty healthy right-handed adults (17 females and 13 males, aged
20–40 years, mean age 27 years) participated in the experiment. All participants
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. None had history of head injury, a
diagnosis of any neurological or psychiatric condition, or was currently on
medication affecting the central nervous system. The study was approved by the
University College of London Research Ethics Committee. All participants
provided written informed consent and were paid for participating.
Experimental paradigm and procedure. During MRI scan, participants
performed a computer-based decision-making task lasting B40min (Fig. 1a). On
each trial, a monetary amount (referred as trial amount), changing trial-by-trial,
was presented in the centre of the screen and participants had to choose whether to
accept half of it for sure (pressing a right button) or select a gamble (pressing a left
button). The prospects of this choice were always zero and the full monetary
amount, each with equal probability. Therefore, on every trial the certain option
and the gamble always had the same EV.
The task was organized in short blocks, each comprising ﬁve trials. Each block
was associated with one of two contexts that determined the possible EVs
associated with the block. These EVs were d1, d3 and d5 for the low-value context,
and d3, d5 and d7 for the high-value context. Contexts were indicated by the
corresponding average trial amount, displayed in brackets on the top of the screen
throughout the block, namely d6 and d10 (corresponding to d3 and d5 EV) for the
low- and high-value context, respectively. To maximize attention to this contextual
cue, the task was made as simple as possible by ﬁxing the buttons used for making
choices (that is, the right and left buttons were always used to select the safe option
and the gamble, respectively).
Before a new block started, the construction ‘New set’ appeared for 2 s during
the inter-block interval, followed by the context (average trial amount) shown for
2 s. Next, the trial amount of the ﬁrst trial was displayed followed, right after a
response was performed, by the outcome of the choice, shown for 1 s. The block
average amount remained on the screen during an inter-trial interval lasting 1.5 s.
The order of blocks, trial amounts and outcomes were pseudo-randomized.
Participants had 3 s to make their choices; otherwise the statement ‘too late’
appeared and they received an outcome of zero. At the end of the experiment, one
outcome was randomly selected among those received and added to an initial
participation payment of d17.
Participants were tested at the Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging at the
University College London. Before scanning, they were fully instructed about the
task rules and payment method (that is, they were told that only one outcome
would be selected for payment), and practiced for up to 20 unpaid trials. Inside the
scanner, participants performed the task in two separate sessions, followed by a
12min structural scan. After scanning, participants were debriefed and informed
about their total remuneration.
fMRI scanning and analysis. The task was programmed using the Cogent toolbox
(Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging) in Matlab. Visual stimuli were back
projected onto a translucent screen positioned behind the bore of the magnet and
viewed via an angled mirror. Blood oxygenation level dependent contrast
functional images were acquired with echo-planar T2*-weighted (EPI) imaging
using a Siemens Trio 3-Tesla MR system with a 32-channel head coil. To optimize
the coverage of our ROIs, a partial volume of the ventral part of the brain was
imaged. Each image volume comprised 25 interleaved 3-mm-thick sagittal slices
(in-plane resolution¼ 3 3mm; time to echo¼ 30ms; repetition time¼ 1.75 s).
The ﬁrst six volumes were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration effects.
T1-weighted structural images were acquired at a 1 1 1mm resolution.
Functional MRI data were analysed using statistical parametric mapping version 8.
Data preprocessing included spatial realignment, unwarping using individual ﬁeld
maps, slice timing correction, normalization and smoothing. Speciﬁcally,
functional volumes were realigned to the mean volume, were spatially normalized
to the standard Montreal Neurological Institute template with a 3 3 3 voxel
size, and were smoothed with 8mm Gaussian kernel. High-pass ﬁltering with a
cut-off of 128 s and AR(1)-model were applied.
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Neural responses were modelled with a canonical hemodynamic response
function and a GLM including six stimulus functions encoding option presentation
separately for each choice EV (d1, d3 and d5 for the low-value context and d3, d5
and d7 for the high-value context). Each of these stick functions was modulated by
the corresponding RPE, computed as the difference between the outcomes minus
the EV. Thus, RPEs were zero for certain option choices and had positive or
negative values when gambles were chosen. The GLM also included a stick function
regressor at option presentation for the ﬁrst trials of each block. This was
modulated by a binary variable, indicating whether the block was a high- or
low-value context. The GLM was estimated separately for each half of each of the
two sessions of the task. The GLM included also 6 movement and 17 physiological
(derived from breathing and heart rate signals) nuisance regressors.
Contrasts of interest were computed subject by subject, and used for
second-level (between subjects) one-sample t-tests and regressions across subjects
using standard summary statistic approach66. Statistical (SVC) tests focused on the
following ROIs: bilateral ventral striatum, VTA/SN and bilateral posterior
hippocampus. For VTA/SN we used bilateral anatomical masks manually deﬁned
using the software MRIcro and the mean structural image for the group, similar to
the approach used in previous studies67. For ventral striatum we used a 8mm
sphere centred on a priori coordinates extracted from a recent metanalysis49
(left:  12, 12,  6; right: 12, 10,  6). For posterior hippocampus, we used the
template available in the MarsBar Toolbox atlas, and, given our speciﬁc interest on
the posterior portion, we split the template relative to the vertical axis, resulting in
the inclusion of voxels with z4 12 coordinates. Statistics of ROIs were SVC
using a family wise error rate of Po0.05 as the signiﬁcance threshold. For
exploratory purposes, we also analysed other brain regions where statistics
were corrected with respect to the recorded partial volume of the brain, using
Po0.05 FWE as the signiﬁcance threshold. These results are reported in
Supplementary Table 1.
Data availability. All data necessary to reproduce the results reported are available
on request to the corresponding author.
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